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829 
APPLAUDING URUGUAY’S QUEST FOR 
JUSTICE: DICTATORSHIP, AMNESTY, AND 
REPEAL OF URUGUAY LAW NO. 15.848. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. Dictatorship in Uruguay 1973–1985  
Uruguay has been an independent state since 1828, and constitutionally 
governed since 1830.1 In 1967, the state adopted a new constitution (1967 
Constitution).2 However, the protections guaranteed by the 1967 
Constitution began to erode only a year later, on June 13, 1968, as the 
government instituted Prompt Security Measures (MPS) in an effort to 
curb the growing social unrest that resulted from recent economic 
instability.3 
In March 1972, Juan Maria Bordaberry won the election for the 
Colorado Party, setting the stage for the implementation of a dictatorship 
in subsequent years.4 Bordaberry immediately pushed for the 
implementation of the Law on State Security and Public Order (State 
 
 
 1. BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: 
URUGUAY, (Jun. 23, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/uruguay/187431.htm 
[hereinafter Background Note: Uruguay]. Independence was codified in the Treaty of Montevideo in 
1828, and was the result of a three-year struggle for independence from Brazil. Id.  
 2. Background Note: Uruguay, supra note 1. The Constitution established that:  
The inhabitants of the Republic have the right to be secure in their enjoyment of life, honor, 
liberty, safety, work and property. No one may be deprived of these rights except in 
accordance with the laws that are established for reasons of the public interest. 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA ORIENTAL DEL URUGUAY DE 1967 [C.P.], § 2, art. 7 
(Uru.), available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Uruguay/uruguay67.html, (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2013) [hereinafter 1967 Constitution]. Translation by author. The 1967 Constitution also 
strengthened the system of checks and balances in Uruguay. Id. 
 3. SERVICIO PAZ Y JUSTICIA [SERVICE FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE], URUGUAY NUNCA MAS: 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 1972–1985 6 (Elizabeth Hampsten trans., 1989). In addition to 
authorizing the ignorance of civil liberties, the MPS also allowed the executive branch of the 
Uruguayan government to “name administrators of state institutions, suspend student and teacher 
activities, ‘militarize’ public and private businesses, suspend the activities of banking and financial 
institutions, control credit for agriculture, and administer rent control.” Id. at 9. Uruguay’s GDP per 
capita was a mere $581.26 in 1967 (as compared to $4152.02 in the United States at the same time). 
Uruguay and United States GDP Comparison, WORLD BANK, http://www.google.com/publicdata/ 
explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_cd&idim=country:URY&dl=en&hl=en&q=uruguay+
gdp+per+capita+chart#ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_cd&scale_y=lin& 
ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim=country:URY:USA&ifdim=country&hl=en&dl=en (last updated 
Sept. 8, 2013). And this was an improvement following the economic recession in the late 1950s. Luis 
Bértola, Uruguay’s Early History: An Overview of the Economic History of Uruguay Since the 1870s, 
ECONOMIC HISTORY SERIES ENCYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 2, 2010, 12:08), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/ 
bertola.uruguay.final. 
 4. SERVICIO PAZ Y JUSTICIA, supra note 3, at 27. 
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Security Law), which was designed to supplement the existing MPS and 
allow the government greater control over subversive forces in Uruguay.5 
By 1973, the military had taken full control,6 establishing a “civilian-
military regime,” characterized by widespread human rights abuses.7 
While the human rights abuses took many forms,8 perhaps the most 
egregious were the state-sanctioned “disappearances,”9 which official 
estimates put in the hundreds.10 The abuses went well beyond 
disappearances, but the extent of the abuses in Uruguay at that time was 
largely unknown, since the military regime so closely shielded any 
intrastate activities from the eyes of the outside world.11  
Following the return to full elections after the “civilian-military 
regime,” Julio Maria Sanguinetti took office in 1985.12 A few of his first 
orders of business were to release all political prisoners13 and create two 
commissions to investigate the human rights abuses during the 
dictatorship.14 The first of these commissions was known as the 
Commission for the Investigation of the Situation of the Disappeared and 
Related Events (Commission for the Disappeared) and the second was the 
Investigating Commission on the Kidnapping and Assassination of the 
National Representatives Zelmar Michelini and Hector Gutierrez Ruiz 
(Investigative Commission on Kidnapping).15 Unfortunately, these two 
 
 
 5. Id. at 27, 31–32. The State Security Law was passed by the Uruguayan legislature, despite 
findings that it was unconstitutional. Id. at 31–32. Moreover, the Senate Constitution and Legislation 
Commission (Senate Commission) convened to examine the constitutionality of the law, and found 
that the law was likely unconstitutional. Id. at 31. The Senate Commission’s findings resulted in the 
legislature temporarily suspending their consideration of the law, but the legislature eventually voted 
the law through in response to threats of a military takeover. Id. at 32. 
 6. Bordaberry officially dissolved the legislature in June 1973, and the dissolution of the Civil 
Service followed soon after. Id. at 37. However, the power of the judiciary to combat any actions of 
the executive was taken away before that with the passage of the State Security Law, and human rights 
abuses in Uruguay began before June 1973. Id.  
 7. Background Note: Uruguay, supra note 1. 
 8. See generally SERVICIO PAZ Y JUSTICIA, supra note 3, at 61–230 (discussing arrests, torture, 
military justice, extended imprisonments, poor care in prison facilities, murders, and forced 
disappearances). 
 9. For a longer general discussion on the forced disappearances, see id. at 214–30. The 
disappearances included both adults and children, at least one child as young as twenty days old. Id. at 
225. 
 10. Paula Lopez-Gamundi, Uruguay: A Bitter Lesson in Forgiving, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC 
AFF. (Jun. 7, 2011), http://www.coha.org/uruguay-a-bitter-lesson-in-forgiving/.  
 11. Truth Commission: Uruguay, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-
commission-uruguay (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).  
 12. Uruguay–History, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/ 
Americas/Uruguay-HISTORY.html#b (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).  
 13. Id.  
 14. Truth Commission: Uruguay, supra note 11.  
 15. Id. The Commission for the Disappeared contained lists of the disappeared, as well as the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss4/9
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commissions were short-lived, and received no official response from the 
government.16 
B. Uruguay’s 1986 Expiry Law 
In 1986, in an effort to leave the past behind, the Uruguayan legislature 
passed Uruguay’s Expiry Law, granting amnesty to many military and 
police officers for human rights violations committed during the 
dictatorship.17 The Expiry Law, Law No. 15.848, purports to recognize the 
termination of the “exercise of the punitive aim of the state relating to 
crimes committed before March 1, 1985 for military and political actions 
. . . .”
18
 While the Expiry Law contains sixteen Articles, the most 
important are Articles 3 and 4. Article 3 requires the judicial branch to 
consult with the executive before opening any cases related to 
dictatorship-era human rights violations.19 While some believe that Article 
4 tempered the law by allowing the executive to override the default of 
non-prosecution in certain situations and allow for investigations,20 others 
believe that Article 4 only leads to selective exceptions to the general 
prohibition on investigation and can only hurt the search for truth and 
justice.21  
 
 
locations of the disappearances. Many disappeared outside of Uruguay, in Argentina, Chile, or 
Paraguay, making evident the coordinated efforts of the governments to keep their constituents in 
submission. SERVICIO PAZ Y JUSTICIA, supra note 3, at 343–47.  
 16. Truth Commission: Uruguay, supra note 11. 
 17. Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Puntitiva del Estado, Ley No. 15.848 [Expiry Law], 
Publicada D.O. 28 diciembre 1986, No. 22295, (Dec. 22, 1986), http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/leyes/ 
AccesoTextoLey.asp?Ley=15848&Anchor= [hereinafter Expiry Law].  
 18. Id. Translated from “Se reconoce que ha caducado el ejercicio de la pretensión punitiva del 
estado respecto de los delitos cometidos hasta el 1º de marzo de 1985.” Translation by author.  
 19. Id. Article 3 indicates that “[f]or the purposes specified in the preceding articles, a judge 
presiding over any of the denounced complaints, will be required to inform the executive power, 
within 30 days of receiving the complaint, whether the researched complaint is covered in Article 1 of 
this Act.” Id., art. 3. Translation by author. Article 3 further indicates that “If, the executive thus 
informs, the judge will arrange the closure and filing with previous claims. If, on the other hand, there 
is no reply or the executive informs that the act is not covered, the judge shall arrange to continue the 
investigation.” Id. Translation by author.  
 20. Article 4 provides that “Without prejudice to what is disallowed in the preceding articles, the 
judge of the case may choose to send testimony of the reports to the Executive. . . [and if it chooses to] 
the executive power will order an immediate investigation with the intention of clearing up [possible 
violations].” Id., art. 4. Translation by author.  
 21. See Uruguay’s Expiry Law Silences Democracy, GLOBALIZATION 101 (Aug. 8, 2011), 
http://www.globalization101.org/uruguay’s-expiry-law-silences-democracy-2/ (in support of the 
proposition that the Expiry Law was a political tool, designed to cover up the abuses of the Colorado 
Party, and thus would inevitably lead to inequitable enforcement perpetuation of political inequality).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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C. Referendums 
In a political move that appears to be unprecedented, Uruguay has 
twice put the Expiry Law to a referendum, and both times the Uruguayan 
people have voted to keep the Expiry Law, despite its safe harbor for 
human rights violators.22 Votes in favor of the Expiry Law did not prevail 
by a wide margin in either case, but the two referendums, held twenty 
years apart in 1989 and 2009 (1989 Referendum and 2009 Referendum, 
respectively), are indicative of a widespread sentiment in Uruguay that the 
majority wants to move forward and focus on continuing to build a 
sustainable democracy.23 
D. Judicial Response to the Expiry Law in Uruguay and Internationally 
The Uruguayan Supreme Court and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACHR) have held the Expiry Law to be unconstitutional. 
Only days before the 2009 Referendum, the Uruguayan Supreme Court 
held the Expiry Law unconstitutional.24 Following the decision, lawyers 
for human rights abuse victim Nibia Salsagaray25 remarked that “it’s 
understood that this sets a precedent and that the Supreme Court won’t 
change if presented with a similar case.”26 Because the declaration of 
unconstitutionality in this case was only as-applied, the holding did not 
 
 
 22. Reuters, Uruguay to Open to Rights Cases of Dictator Era, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2011, at A6, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/americas/01uruguay.html [hereinafter Uruguay 
to Open Rights Cases]. There are indications, however, that the Colorado Party, coupled with the 
military, scared the public into believing that there would be consequences if the law were repealed. 
See generally JOHN HIGLEY AND RICHARD GUNTHER, ELITES AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN 
LATIN AMERICA AND SOUTHERN EUROPE 178–208 (1992). 
 23. The 1989 Referendum showed 57% in favor of keeping the law, and 43% in favor of 
repealing the law. Elana Rissy and Juan Andres Elhordoy, Ley de Caducidad, Dos Décadas Después 
la Discusión se Renueva [Expiry Law, Two Decades Later, the Discussion is Renewed], EL 
ESPECTADOR [THE SPECTATOR] (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.espectador.com/1v4_contenido.php?m= 
&id=144926&ipag=2. The 2009 Referendum produced similar results, with 53% in favor of keeping 
the law, and 47% in favor of repealing the law. Ekaterina Sivolobova, Uruguay: Approaches to the 
Expiry Law, JURIST: LEGAL NEWS AND RESEARCH (June 10, 2010), http://jurist.org/dateline/ 
2010/06/uruguay-approaches-to-the-expiry-law.php. There are indications, though, that the Uruguayan 
media’s failure to publicize the 2009 Referendum led to a decreased voter turnout, and the vote was 
not necessarily indicative of the population. Id. For a geographic breakdown of the 2009 Referendum 
in Uruguay’s major cities, see Uruguay: Amnesty Law Referendum 2009, ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY, 
http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/u/uruguay/uruguay-amnesty-law-referendum-
2009.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
 24. Uruguay Dirty War Amnesty Illegal, BBC NEWS (Oct. 20, 2009, 11:26), http://news.bbc.co 
.uk/2/hi/americas/8316000.stm. 
 25. Id. Nibia Salsagaray was a Communist who died while in military custody during the 
dictatorial regime. Id. 
 26. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss4/9
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effectively annul the law.27 However, Prosecutor Mirtha Guianze, who 
was instrumental in bringing the Salsagaray case to the Supreme Court, 
remarked that “[i]f the law is annulled [in the referendum], there won’t be 
any sense in ruling that it’s unconstitutional, but if the referendum doesn’t 
get enough votes, there is the possibility of making this argument in other 
cases.”28 
The Uruguayan Supreme Court repeated its declaration of 
unconstitutionality in 2010, allowing the opening of an investigation into 
Bordaberry’s role in twenty deaths during his regime, and ruling 
unanimously that the Expiry Law was unconstitutional as-applied to 
Bordaberry in this case.29 
The IACHR has also held Uruguay’s Expiry Law unconstitutional.30 
The ruling was decided in the case of Maria Claudia Garcia Iruretagoyena 
Gelman, who was disappeared in the 1970s.31 The IACHR held 
specifically that the actions taken with respect to Gelman were in violation 
of the American Convention on Human Rights, and declared the Expiry 
Law incompatible with Uruguay’s obligations under the American 
Convention on Human Rights.32 
 
 
 27. Id. (“The Supreme Court’s ruling came in the case of Nibia Salsagaray . . . [who] died 35 
years ago in a military barracks.”). Id. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Uruguay Annual Report 2011, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/uruguay 
/report-2011 (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). The purpose of allowing the case to proceed, though, was 
largely symbolic, as Bordaberry was already serving concurrent thirty-year sentences for constitutional 
violations and extrajudicial killings performed during his regime. Uruguayan Amnesty Law 
Unconstitutional, AMERICAS QUARTERLY (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/ 
1974. 
 30. Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 221 
(Feb. 24, 2011). In Gelman v. Uruguay, the IACHR held Uruguay responsible for the disappearance of 
Maria Claudia Garcia Irutetagoyena de Gelman. Id.; Press Release, Amnesty International, Uruguay 
Must Investigate and Prosecute Crimes of the Past (Sept. 26, 2011) (available at http://www 
.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/uruguay-must-investigate-and-prosecute-crimes-past-2011-
09-26). The American Convention on Human Rights was signed at the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on Human Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica, in November of 1969, and is designed to create 
and implement “a system of personal liberty and social justice based on the essential rights of man.” 
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, pmbl., Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American 
_Convention_on_Human_Rights.pdf. There were nineteen original signatories to the Convention, but 
only ten that recognize the authority of the IACHR. American Convention on Human Rights: Members 
Chart, INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic4.Amer 
.Conv.Ratif.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). Uruguay is among those ten countries, and thus is subject 
to jurisdiction of the IACHR. Id. Although signing in 1969 in San Jose, Uruguay did not ratify the 
Convention nor recognize the authority of the IACHR until April 1985, following the fall of the 
dictatorship. Id. 
 31. Inter-American Court of Human Rights Says Uruguay Must Investigate and Punish 
Dictatorship Crimes, CTR. FOR JUSTICE AND INT’L LAW (Mar. 23, 2011), http://cejil.org/node/2138. 
 32. Id. Though the IACHR chose to invalidate the law based on the American Convention on 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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E. Recent Developments 
In the midst of the most recent referenda and judicial decisions, 
Uruguay also elected a new president in 2009, Jose Mujica.33 Mujica 
publicly supported the repeal of the Expiry Law at the beginning of his 
presidency,34 but shortly thereafter changed his position, asking that 
Uruguayans not “transfer the frustrations of our generation to the new 
generations,”35 and instead look only to the future.36  
Despite Mujica’s recommendation to let the Expiry Law stand, a new 
law was drafted in 2010 that would supersede and effectively repeal the 
Expiry Law, and this law received preliminary approval from the Chamber 
of Deputies in Uruguay in 2010.37 Several months later, in April 2011, the 
 
 
Human Rights, the law has also been challenged under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR], the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 
U.N.T.S. 17, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), [hereinafter ICCPR], and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent 
and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67 (1985) [hereinafter IACPPT]. Mariana 
Rodriguez-Pareja and Salvador Herencia Carrasco, Uruguay: Expiry Law Revoked, RADIO 
NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/uruguay-
expiry-law-revoked. The UDHR and the ICCPR were adopted by the United Nations and apply to 
Uruguay, which is a United Nations member. United Nations Members, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/members/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). The IACPPT was adopted by the 
Organization of American States (OAS), and Uruguay assented to the treaty in 1992. Signatories and 
Ratifications: Multilateral Treaties: Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, DEP’T 
OF INT’L LAW: ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-51.html (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2013). 
 33. Uruguay: Country Profile, BBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/ 
country_profiles/1229360.stm. Mujica was elected in 2009, and took office in 2010. Id. He was 
imprisoned during the dictatorship, and his election for the Broad Front leftist party alarmed many 
conservatives in Uruguay. Id. However, Mujica has publicly gone on record saying that he has no 
vengeance against those that imprisoned him during the dictatorship. Id.  
 34. Uruguay President Mujica Approval Rating Plunges 29 Points in 15 Months, MERCO PRESS 
(June 17, 2011), http://en.mercopress.com/2011/06/17/uruguay-president-mujica-approval-rating-plunges 
-29-points-in-15-months [hereinafter Approval Rating Plunges].  
 35. Uruguay Congress Upholds Military Rule Amnesty Law, BBC NEWS (May 20, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13480101.  
 36. Major Setback for President Mujica and for Uruguayan Ruling Coalition, MERCO PRESS 
(May 16, 2011), http://en.mercopress.com/2011/05/16/major-setback-for-president-mujica-and-for-
the-uruguayan-ruling-coalition [hereinafter Major Setback]. Mujica has warned of the “political 
dangers” of repealing the law, and has also suggested that it could be an unconstitutional deprivation 
of the rights of citizens to repeal the law, given the outcomes of the 1989 Referendum and 2009 
Referendum. Uruguay Congress Upholds Military Rule Amnesty Law, supra note 35. Mujica’s 
viewpoint, however, is far from universal; even in his own party, as fellow Broad Front party member 
Felipe Michelini explained, “the truth remains kidnapped [as long as the Expiry Law still stands].” Id.  
 Political analysts attribute Mujica’s decline in approval ratings from 75% at the time of his 
election to a dismal 44% as of June 2011 in large part to disapproval over his stance related to the 
Expiry Law. Approval Rating Plunges, supra note 34.  
 37. Rachel Getzels, Uruguay: Deputies Sanction Rulings that Invalidate Amnesty Law, 
ARGENTINA INDEPENDENT (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/news 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss4/9
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law passed the Uruguayan Chamber of Senators with minor 
modifications.38 Due to the modifications, however, the bill had to return 
to the Chamber of Deputies.39 In 2009, Jose Mujica’s Broad Front Party 
held the majority (50 seats) in the Chamber of Deputies.40 Had the voting 
progressed strictly along party lines, with the Broad Front Party voting for 
the annulment of the Expiry Law, the Expiry Law would have been 
annulled by a 50–49 vote. However, just before the vote, Broad Front 
member Victor Semproni left the debate, and refused to vote.41 As a result, 
while the entire remaining Broad Front Party voted to annul the Expiry 
Law, the rest of the Chamber of Deputies voted against it, and the result 
was a 49–49 deadlock that left the Expiry Law still intact.42  
Despite his fluctuating position toward the Expiry Law, Mujica has 
done his part to curtail its effect. In late June 2011, following the failure to 
annul the Expiry Law, Mujica authorized the Judiciary to reopen as many 
as eighty human rights cases pursuant to Article 4 of the Expiry Law.43 
 
 
roundups/roundupslatinamerica/uruguay-deputies-sanction-rulings-that-invalidate-the-amnesty-law-/. 
The Uruguayan legislature is bicameral, and divided into ninety-nine seats in the Chamber of Deputies 
(also known as the Chamber of Representatives), and thirty seats in the Chamber of Senators. CIA 
World Factbook: Uruguay, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/geos/uy.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). Of the eighty Deputies present at the vote 
sanctioning the invalidation of the Expiry Law, fifty voted to invalidate the law. Getzels, supra note 
37. The potential annulment of the Expiry Law generated a great deal of attention from citizens, 
including strikers and protestors. Id.  
 38. Uruguay Senate Votes to Annul Amnesty Law for Crimes During Dictatorship, LATIN 
AMERICA NEWS DISPATCH (Apr. 13, 2011), http://latindispatch.com/2011/04/13/uruguay-senate-votes-
to-annul-amnesty-law-for-crimes-during-dictatorship/ [hereinafter Uruguay Senate Votes to Annul 
Amnesty Law]. The vote passed 16-15 in the Senate. Id. While there are only officially thirty votes in 
the Senate, the vice president sits with the senate, for a total of thirty-one votes. Uruguay 2009, 
ELECTIONS, REFERENDUMS AND ELECTORAL SOCIOLOGY AROUND THE WORLD (Oct. 28, 2009), 
http://welections.wordpress.com/2009/10/28/uruguay-2009/ [hereinafter Uruguay 2009].  
 39. Uruguay Senate Votes to Annul Amnesty Law, supra note 38. 
 40. Uruguay 2009, supra note 38.  
 41. Uruguayan Congress Fails to Gain a Majority to Annul Amnesty Law, LATIN AMERICAN 
DISPATCH (May 20, 2011), http://latindispatch.com/2011/05/20/uruguayan-congress-fails-to-gain-a-
majority-to-annul-amnesty-law/. Semproni claimed that he believed the proposal would not solve the 
problems of the Expiry Law, and that there were better ways to fix “this stain” on Uruguay’s past. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Uruguay to Open Rights Cases, supra note 22. Mujica authorized the reopening of the cases 
despite his comment that “only time and death of all of us involved at the time will heal definitively 
these wounds.” Uruguay: Overturning Amnesty Law Could Cost Ruling Coalition ‘Dearly,’ MERCO 
PRESS (May 3, 2011), http://en.mercopress.com/2011/05/03/uruguay-overturning-amnesty-law-could-
cost-ruling-coalition-dearly [hereinafter Could Cost Ruling Coalition]. The move was met with a great 
deal of resistance from retired military officers, and the status of the Expiry Law has been a source of 
Mujica’s slipping approval ratings. Uruguay to Open Rights Cases, supra note 22. The decision to 
reopen cases came on the heels of another Uruguayan Supreme Court decision classifying crimes 
committed during the dictatorship as serious “common crimes,” or “delitos comunes,” rather than 
crimes against humanity. The difference lies in the statute of limitations. Corte Ratifica que Delitos No 
Son Considerados de Lesa Humanidad [Court Rules that Crimes are Not Considered Crimes Against 
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Uruguay then stood at a crossroads. The legislature had refused to comply 
with national and international judicial interpretations of the Expiry Law, 
and had instead sided with a slim majority of Uruguayan citizens who 
voted to keep the Expiry Law. The legislature had made the implicit 
determination to ignore the cries for answers and justice and instead move 
forward, relying on a likely unconstitutional law. 
All this changed in late October 2011. Just when it seemed that the 
legislative failure to repeal the law in April and May of 2011 meant the 
death of any opportunity to confront the crimes of the dictatorship era 
head on, the Chamber of Senators and Chamber of Deputies, following a 
“long and intense debate,”44 passed a law repealing the Expiry Law.45 The 
Expiry Repeal Law, No. 18.831,46 expressly repealed the current law,47 
eliminated the possibility of any procedural defaults that would bar 
prosecution,48 and legislatively reclassified crimes during the dictatorship 
as crimes against humanity, effectively eliminating any statute of 
limitations that would bar the prosecutions.49 The law also has two major 
 
 
Humanity], EL PAIS [THE COUNTRY] (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.elpais.com.uy/110531/pnacio-
569957/nacional/corte-ratifica-que-delitos-no-son-considerados-de-lesa-humanidad/ [hereinafter Corte 
Ratifica]. Whereas a crime against humanity has no statute of limitations, a serious common crime 
must be prosecuted within twenty-six years and eight months after the crime took place. Id. As a 
result, as of June 2011, the final date to submit an appeal for investigation of a crime committed during 
the dictatorship was November 1, 2011. Id.  
 44. Uruguay Overturns Amnesty For Military-Era Crimes, BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15486770 [hereinafter Uruguay Overturns Amnesty]. 
 45. Uruguay Revokes ‘Dirty War’ Amnesty, GLOBAL POST (Oct. 27, 2011), http://mobile.global 
post.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/111027/uruguay-revokes-dirty-war-amnesty. The vote was 
along party lines, as all fifty members of the Broad Front Party voted for the annulment. Id.  
 46. Rodriguez-Pareja and Herencia Carrasco, supra note 32.  
 47. Ley de la Pretensión Puntitiva del Estado, Ley No. 18.831 [Expiry Repeal Law], Publicada 
D.O. 1º noviembre 2011, No. 28340, (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/ 
leyes/AccesoTextoLey.asp?Ley=18831&Anchor=. Article 1 “[r]eestablishes the full exercise of the 
punitive aims of the state for those crimes committed in implementation of state terrorism, until March 
1, 1985, as comprehended in Article 1 of Law 15.858 [Expiry Law] . . . .” Translated from “Artículo 1º 
- Se restablece el pleno ejercicio de la pretensión punitiva del Estado para los delitos cometidos en 
aplicación del terrorismo de Estado hasta el 1º de marzo de 1985, comprendidos en el artículo 1º de la 
Ley Nº 15.848, de 22 de diciembre de 1986.” Id. Translation by author. 
 48. Id. Article 2 states that “[T]here will not be calculated any procedural term, prescription or 
expiration, in the period between December 1986 and the validity of this law, for those crimes referred 
to in Article 1 of this law.” Translated from “Artículo 2º.- No se computará plazo alguno, procesal, de 
prescripción o de caducidad, en el período comprendido entre el 22 de diciembre de 1986 y la vigencia 
de esta ley, para los delitos a que refiere el artículo 1º de esta ley.” Id., art. 2. Translation by author.  
 49. Id. Article 3 “[d]eclares that the crimes referred to in the proceeding articles, are crimes 
against humanity in accordance with international treaties to which the Republic [of Uruguay] is a 
party.” Translated from “Artículo 3º.- Declárase que, los delitos a que refieren los artículos anteriores, 
son crímenes de lesa humanidad de conformidad con los tratados internacionales de los que la 
República es parte.” Id. art. 3. Translation by author. The late October reclassification of the crimes as 
crimes against humanity came just in time; had the crimes not been reclassified before November 1, 
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implicit consequences: First, the Uruguayan judiciary now has full 
autonomy over what cases to open, no longer requiring the approval of the 
executive branch. Second, prosecution of human rights violations will now 
be devoid of the constraints of the political process and the unelected 
judiciary is now free to focus solely on the execution of justice.50  
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA 
The state of affairs in Uruguay, while fascinating and paradoxical, is 
not entirely dissimilar to neighboring South American countries, many of 
which were ruled by dictatorships during the twentieth century.51 Former 
dictatorships have confronted the aftermath of their respective regimes in a 
number of different ways, but the approaches of other Latin American 
countries can provide some guidance when evaluating the wisdom and 
consequences of recent events in Uruguay, leading to the inevitable 
conclusion that, for a variety of reasons, Uruguay’s recent actions are an 
important step toward truth that should serve as an example to those 
countries yet to take these steps to right the wrongs of the past.52 
A. Human Rights Abuses 
Latin America in the latter part of the twentieth century was a hotbed 
for human rights abuses. Arguably, no country has suffered from abuses 
more widespread than Argentina and Chile. Argentina’s “prolonged state 
of virtual Civil War”53 began with a military coup in 1976.54 The 1976–
 
 
many victims may have lost their opportunity to report crimes and bring prosecutions, since the statute 
of limitations was set to expire November 1, 2011. Corte Ratifica, supra note 43.  
 50. Rodriguez-Pareja and Herencia Carrasco, supra note 32. 
 51. See generally RONALD M. SCHNEIDER, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY: PATTERNS 
AND PERSONALITIES (2007); RONALD M. SCHNEIDER, COMPARATIVE LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS 
(2010); JAMES D. COCKROFT, LATIN AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND U.S. POLICY, (1996); JOHN 
CHALRES CHASTEEN, BORN IN BLOOD AND FIRE: A CONCISE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA (2011); 
WILLIAM F. SATER, SOUTHERN CONE NATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA (1984).  
 52. What follows in this Note is not a broad overview of oppression and dictatorships in Latin 
America. Instead, countries included in this Note are only countries that have histories of dictatorships 
and have passed amnesty laws relating to the crimes against humanity during the dictatorship.  
 53. SCHNEIDER, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 51, at 312. 
 54. Id. The coup removed Isabel Perón from power. Id. Her husban Juan Domingo Perón was 
first elected in 1946, with the backing of the labor forces. Perón Deposed in Argentina, HISTORY, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/peron-deposed-in-argentina (last visited Jan. 20, 2013) 
[hereinafter Perón Deposed]. Perón served a full term, and was then elected again in 1952. Id. 
Although Perón was reelected in 1952, he was unable to hold onto public support, due to his repressive 
tactics. DAVID WILLIAM FOSTER, MELISSA FITCH LOCKHART, AND DARRELL B. LOCKHART, CULTURE 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
838 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 12:829 
 
 
 
 
1983 military regime was characterized by a number of human rights 
abuses, including “disappearances,” which some estimate to affect as 
many as 14,000 people.55  
Chile’s human rights history is mostly the history of Augusto 
Pinochet’s reign of terror, which began in 1973 when he led a military 
coup that ousted and murdered Chilean president Salvador Allende, along 
with many others.56 Pinochet’s reign was one of the worst in the 
hemisphere with respect to human rights violations. Within the first three 
months of Pinochet’s reign, 45,000 people were detained for questioning 
regarding their subversive role against the state, and 1,500 were already 
dead.57 According to official reports, during Pinochet’s reign, at least 
3,200 people were murdered, and nearly 30,000 more were tortured.58 
Brazil also fell victim to human rights abuses during a dictatorship 
lasting from 1964–198559 and brought on by political unrest following the 
election of Joao Goulart in 1960.60 The military ousted Goulart in 1964.61 
While the human rights violations in Brazil were not originally thought to 
be as egregious as those in neighboring countries, documents were 
uncovered that forced the Brazilian government to confront the full extent 
of the crimes.62  
Peru, though democratic during the 1980s, took a decidedly 
authoritarian path under elected president Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s in 
 
 
AND CUSTOMS OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF ARGENTINA 62 
(1998). Perón was forced into exile in 1955, Perón Deposed, supra. Returning from exile, Perón was 
re-elected in 1973 before dying in office in 1974, leaving his wife, Isabel Perón, in charge. Id.  
 55. Argentina, Amnesty Laws Struck Down, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 14, 2005), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/06/14/argentina-amnesty-laws-struck-down.  
 56. SCHNEIDER, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 51, at 357–58.  
 57. See Edward C. Snyder, The Dirty Legal War: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Chile 
1973–1995, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 253, 260 (1995).  
 58. Larry Rother, Chile’s Leader Attacks Amnesty Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/24/world/americas/24chile.html.  
 59. Larry Rother, Crimes of Brazil’s Dictatorship Resurface, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/30/world/americas/30iht-brazil.html.  
 60. ROBERT M. LEVINE, THE HISTORY OF BRAZIL 123–24 (1999). 
 61. Id. at 126. Goulart inherited an unstable economy, and the press and labor unions refused to 
let him implement the reforms necessary to permanently stabilize the economy. Id. at 124. This in turn 
pitted the military against Goulart, and led to a military coup in 1964. Id. at 124–26.  
 62. Rother, supra note 58. Although the Brazilian government claimed that any documentation 
evidencing human rights abuses had been destroyed in the 1980s, the recent unearthing of documents 
hidden for two decades proved otherwise. Id. Some say that despite Brazil’s low number of state-
sanctioned disappearances and deaths relative to its neighbors, it was actually the birthplace for 
concepts like “disappeared,” and provided a blueprint for an oppressive authoritarian state. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss4/9
  
 
 
 
 
 
2013] URUGUAY’S QUEST FOR JUSTICE 839 
 
 
 
 
an effort to stabilize the country.63 The results were catastrophic and 
resulted in genocide and torture.64 
B. Amnesty Laws 
Each of these regimes tried to insulate itself from prosecution and 
accountability. In 1983, Argentina elected president Dr. Raúl Alfonsín, 
who oversaw the reimplementation of democracy.65 Alfonsín created the 
National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (Commission on 
Disappearance), which was created to “investigate the fates of the 
thousands who disappeared during the [military] rule.”66 The Commission 
 
 
 63. CIA World Factbook: Peru, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
 64. Estimates put the total dead and disappeared in Peru between 1980 and 2000 at roughly 
69,280 people. Peru, INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSNAT’L JUSTICE, http://ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-
countries/peru (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). The International Center for Transnational Justice explains:  
The violent insurgencies of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) affected vast tracts of the 
Peruvian countryside. In 1984, the Revolutionary Movement Túpac Amaru (Movimiento 
Revolucionario Túpac Amaru, or MRTA) initiated its own armed struggle against the 
government. Both groups committed abuses against civilians. The Peruvian state also 
unleashed systemic abuses, acting under a 1981 Emergency Law. Small, rural communities 
and native peoples of the Andes and Amazon bore the brunt of the violence and lived under a 
reign of terror and torture. In the next decade, President Alberto Fujimori’s repressive rule 
further eroded the rule of law and gave rise to amnesty laws and impunity for government 
death squads. In 2000, he fled the country and a transitional government opened the door to 
truth and justice for two decades of mass human rights violations. 
Id. A 2003 Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that the government and Fujimori were 
directly responsible for many of the human rights abuses. PERU HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: FINAL 
REPORT, PERU TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N (Aug. 28, 2003), http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ 
ingles/ifinal/conclusiones.php. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission explained:  
[B]eginning in 1992 the new counter-subversive strategy [of Fujimori’s administration, 
following the 1992 coup that led to Authoritarian Rule] emphasized the selective elimination 
of political-administrative organizations or subversive groups. A death squad linked to 
Vladimiro Montesinos called “Colina” was responsible for assassinations, forced 
disappearances and cruel and ferocious massacres. The TRC has reasonable grounds to affirm 
that President Alberto Fujimori, his adviser Vladimiro Montesinos, and high level officials of 
the National Intelligence Service are criminally responsible for the assassinations, forced 
disappearances and massacres perpetrated by the “Colina” death squad. 
Id. For a more detailed account of some of the specific instances of human rights violations in Peru, 
including firsthand accounts of murder, rape, and torture as reported by Peruvian officers and 
American correspondents, see Tamara Feinstein, ed., The Search for Truth: The Declassified Record 
on Human Rights Abuses in Peru, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (Aug. 28, 2003), http://www.gwu.edu/ 
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB96/index2.htm. 
 65. Nunca Mas [Never Again], NAT’L COMM’N ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS (1983), 
http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_000.htm (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2012). 
 66. Id. The Commission on Disappearance included reports on individual abductions, torture, 
secret detention centers, deaths, testimony from those in the government, and testimony from those 
who were once labeled as “disappeared,” as well as documentation of the secret detention centers. Id. 
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on Disappearance created great promise that Argentina would confront its 
past head on, but in 1986–1987, Alfonsín pushed Law No. 23,492 and 
Law No. 23,521 through Congress, effectively granting amnesty to most 
members of the military for their crimes against humanity during the 
dictatorship.67 Similar steps were taken in Chile. Early in Pinochet’s reign, 
Chile passed an amnesty law that shielded anyone involved with the 
military from prosecution from murder or torture charges.68 Brazil and 
Peru were no exception. Brazil passed Law No. 6683 toward the end of the 
dictatorship in 1979, granting amnesty for crimes committed by the 
military or members of the government in the name of politics.69 Peru 
passed amnesty laws in 1994–1995 exempting military personnel from 
prosecution for human rights violations during the relevant time period.70 
C. Judicial Responses Internationally and Locally 
In three of these four countries,71 the IACHR has explicitly declared 
the amnesty laws incompatible with the American Convention on Human 
 
 
at Table of Contents. The report attempted to establish the whereabouts of the “disappeared” during 
the time that they were missing, and did so largely through the testimony of freed prisoners and 
eyewitnesses who were also tortured and detained. See, e.g., Id. at Part 1: The Repression, (chronicling 
the disappearance of Dr. Rafael Andrés Perrotta, director-owner of El Cronista Comercial, a 
newspaper with views contrary to those of the dictatorship). In the Commission on Disappearance’s 
own words, despite the dictatorship’s claims that the human rights violations were handled internally, 
“the report shows [that] murder, rape, torture, extortion, looting and other serious crimes went 
unpunished, as long as they were carried out within the framework of the political and ideological 
persecution unleashed during the years 1976 to 1982.” Id. at General Introduction. 
 67. Human Rights Watch, supra note 54. Law No. 24,492 “set a 60-day deadline for the 
initiation of any prosecution,” and Law No. 23,521 “grant[ed] automatic immunity from prosecution to 
all members of the military except top commanders.” Id.  
 68. Rother, supra note 57. The preamble to Decree Law No. 2191 explains that the purpose of 
the law was to “. . . to strengthen the ties that bind Chile as a nation, leaving behind hatred that has no 
meaning today, and fostering all measures that consolidate reunification of all Chileans.” Law No. 
2191, April 18, 1978, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile) [Chilean Amnesty Law], available at 
http://www.archivochile .com/Poder_Dominante/pod_publi_parl/PDparlamento0005.pdf. Translated 
by author. 
 69. Lei No. 6.683, de 28 de Agosto de 1979, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 28.8.1979 
(Braz.) [Brazil Amnesty Law], available at https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l6683.htm.  
 70. Fujimori: Amnesty Law for Human Rights Violators Intended to Bring Stability, PERUVIAN 
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.peruviantimes.com/19/fujimori-laws-were-indented-to-bring-
stability/66/. Fujimori claims that the Peruvian amnesty laws were designed to bring stabilization to 
Peru. Id. He stated, “I considered it necessary to look for a peaceful solution after 14 or 15 years of 
internal war . . . [t]hey were part of a general plan by the government to lead Peru to Peace.” Id. The 
laws provided for the prosecution of human rights violators only in a military court and for the 
protection of all other military officers who had committed human rights violations during the regime. 
Id.  
 71. The exception is Argentina, as Argentina explicitly repealed its laws before any case was 
brought to the IACHR challenging the laws. See infra note 72; infra note 73. 
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Rights.72 Several of these countries have also responded internally to the 
impediments to justice, both judicially and congressionally, providing 
citizens with a sense of relief, and reaffirming the commitment toward 
truth and justice.  
Argentina’s amnesty laws stood for more than a decade, but in 2001, 
the first rulings began to come from the lower Argentine courts, holding 
the laws to be unconstitutional.73 The Argentine Congress formally 
recognized these non-binding declarations of the amnesty law’s 
unconstitutionality in 2003, when the laws were officially annulled.74 Two 
 
 
 72. In Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001), the 
IACHR held Amnesty Laws 26479 and 26492 to be outside the limits of what is permissible under 
international law. The case stemmed from a 1991 incident when:  
[S]ix heavily-armed individuals burst into the building located at No. 840 Jiron Huanta in the 
neighborhood known as Barrios Altos in Lima. When this irruption occurred, a “pollada” that 
was being held that is a party to collect funds in order to repair the building . . . . The [armed 
men] . . . covered their faces with balaclava masks and obliged the alleged victims to lie on 
the floor. Once they were on the floor, the assailants fired at them indiscriminately for about 
two minutes, killing 15 people and seriously injuring another four . . . .  
Barrios Altos, ¶ 2(a)-(b). The court held specifically that Peru’s amnesty laws violated Articles 4 (the 
right to life), 5 (right to humane treatment), and 8 and 25 (fair trial provisions) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, and that the amnesty laws were “incompatible with the American 
Convention on Human Rights and, consequently, lack legal effect.” Barrios Altos, ¶¶ 51(2)–(4). The 
IACHR also ordered that Peru investigate and prosecute human rights violations. Id. ¶ 51(5).  
 In Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 26, 2006), 
the IACHR ruled unanimously that Chile had not met its obligations as laid out in the American 
Convention on Human Rights and that, “[i]nsofar as it was intended to grant amnesty to those 
responsible for crimes against humanity, Decree Law No. 2191 is incompatible with the American 
Convention and, therefore, it has no legal effects.” Almonacid-Arellano, ¶ 171(2)–(3). The IACHR 
further held that Chile must “ensure that Decree Law No. 2191 does not continue to hinder the 
investigation, prosecution, and if applicable, punishment of those responsible for [similar extra legal 
executions] in Chile . . . .” Id. ¶ 171(6). Despite the invalidation by the IACHR, the law still stands 
today. 
 In Lund v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 219 (Nov. 24, 2010), the IACHR held that Brazil’s amnesty law violated the 
American Convention on Human Rights, and was thus incompatible with Brazil’s international 
obligations. Peter Kornbluh and Erin Maskell, Inter-American Human Rights Court Holds Brazil 
Accountable for Human Rights Crimes, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (Dec. 15, 2010), http://nsarchive 
.wordpress.com/2010/12/15/inter-american-human-rights-court-holds-brazil-accountable-for-human-
rights-crimes/. The IACHR found that Brazil had committed violations of rights to life, liberty, and 
personal integrity in an effort to oppress any opposition to the state. Id. The IACHR further ordered: 
[Brazil] . . . must carry out all efforts to determine the whereabouts of the disappeared 
persons, . . . provide the medical and psychological treatment as required by the victims, . . . 
carry out a public act of acknowledgement of its international responsibility, . . . adopt, in a 
reasonable period of time, the necessary measures to codify the crime of enforced 
disappearance . . . . 
Lund, ¶ 325(10), (11), (13), (14).  
 73. Argentina: Amnesty Laws Struck Down, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 14, 2005), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/06/14/argentina-amnesty-laws-struck-down.  
 74. Tribune News Services, Argentine Mothers Rejoice at Repeal of Amnesty Laws, CHI. TRIB. 
(Aug. 22, 2003), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-08-22/news/0308220288_1_human-rights-
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years later in June 2005, the Supreme Court of Argentina officially 
declared the law unconstitutional, setting a binding precedent and 
foreclosing the possibility of any analogous law existing in Argentina as 
long as democracy remained intact.75  
Peru took a similar step in 2001, expressly repealing its laws in order to 
comply with the IACHR’s ruling.76 For Peru, the saga did not end there. In 
2010, the Peruvian Congress passed Legislative Decree 1097.77 Legislative 
Decree 1097 set a backdated limit on human rights prosecutions, limiting 
any prosecutions to human rights crimes that occurred during or after 
November 2003.78 Perhaps in response to criticism, and perhaps on the 
volition of his own conscience, President Alan García sent a bill to 
 
 
amnesty-laws-military-officers. Mothers of many of the disappeared were quoted as saying the repeal 
was necessary in their “quest for justice.” Id.  
 75. Argentina: Amnesty Laws Struck Down, supra note 73. The repeal of the amnesty law opened 
the door for the prosecution of former military officials, and in April 2010, Reynaldo Bignone, the last 
Argentine dictator, was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for his role in the oppression, 
kidnapping, and torture of individuals during the dictatorship. Associated Press, Argentina’s Last 
Dictator Gets 25-Year Prison Sentence, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2010/apr/21/argentina-dictator-reynaldo-bignone-prison [hereinafter Argentina’s Last Dictator]. 
Bignone was not the only one sentenced, but he was the most prominent, as six other military officials 
were given prison sentences that ranged from seventeen to twenty-five years. Charles Newberry & 
Alexei Barrionuevo, 25 Years for Leader of Argentine Dictatorship, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, at A8, 
available at http://www.nytimes .com/2010/04/21/world/americas/21argentina.html. Family members 
of the disappeared watched as the verdict was read and Estela de Carlotto, president of the human 
rights group, Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, remarked that “[t]oday is a good day for Argentines 
. . . [w]e are in agreement [with the ruling], but a lot remains to be done. There are hundreds more 
accused.” Argentina’s Last Dictator, supra. As of June 2010, two more trials were opened, with 31 
defendants in total. Former Argentine Dictator to Go to Trial in Rights Abuse Case, CNN (June 30, 
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-30/world/argentina.human.rights.trials_1_dirty-war-human-rights 
-abuses-trial?_s=PM:WORLD.  
 76. Peru: Attacks on Justice, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS (Aug. 27, 2002), http://icj.wpengine 
.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2002/08/Peru-attacks-on-justice-2002-publications-2002.pdf. The 
repeal of the law was followed by the creation of a Truth Commission. Id.  
 77. Decreto Legislativo 1076, 31 de agosto de 2010, EL PERUANO, DIARIO OFICIAL 424816 1 de 
septiembre de 2010 (Peru). Executive Decrees Raise Concern of “Amnesty” for Human Rights Crimes, 
and Criminalization of Social Protests, PERUVIAN TIMES (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.peruviantimes 
.com/06/executive-decrees-raise-concern-of-amnesty-for-human-rights-crimes-and-criminalization-of-
social-protests/7966/ [hereinafter Executive Decrees Raise Concern]. 
 78. Id. The law also provides relief for those that have suffered from exceedingly long 
investigations. Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, IACHR Expresses Concern Over 
Decree 1097 in Peru, (Sept. 9, 2010) (Press Release No. 91/10) (available at http://www.cidh.org/ 
Comunicados/English/2010/91-10eng.htm) [hereinafter Press Release No. 91/10]. Legislative Decree 
1097 was met with opposition and concern from inside Peru. Executive Decrees Raise Concern, supra 
note 76. However, the concern over the new law did not stop there. The IACHR expressed concern 
over Legislative Decree 1097, worried that “this decree could lead to impunity in hundreds of cases 
involving serious human rights violations that occurred during the armed conflict that Peru 
experienced in the 1980s and the 1990s—especially since civil society . . . ha[s] suggested repeatedly 
that the executive branch has kept these trials from moving forward.” Press Release No. 91/10, supra. 
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Congress in September 2010 to repeal Legislative Decree 1097.79 One day 
after the request was sent to Congress, Legislative Decree 1097 was 
officially repealed and the barrier to prosecution was removed.80 
Although Chile officially stripped Pinochet of his immunity from trial 
in 2000,81 the country has never actually repealed its amnesty law.82 As a 
result, despite the IACHR’s ruling that Chile’s amnesty law is 
incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights 83 the law 
still stands today. 
In 2005, following the discovery of evidence that revealed the true 
extent of the crimes against humanity committed in Brazil, President Luiz 
 
 
 79. Executive Sends to Congress Bill to Repeal Decree 1097 Following Vargas Llosa 
Resignation from Memory Museum, PERUVIAN TIMES (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.peruviantimes 
.com/13/executive-sends-to-congress-bill-to-repeal-decree-1097-following-vargas-llosa-resignation-from-
memory-museum/8093/. The proposal came in part from protests by former president of the 
commission of the Memory Museum (in honor of those who died during Peru’s internal struggle 1980-
1995), Mario Vargas Llosa, before his resignation in protest of the law. Id.  
 80. Update: Peru’s Congress Votes to Overturn Decree 1097, PERUVIAN TIMES (Sep. 14, 2010), 
http://www.peruviantimes.com/14/update-perus-congress-votes-to-overturn-decree-1097/8118/. The 
decision to repeal came from a debate that lasted only three hours, in which Congress voted 90-1 to 
repeal. Id.  
 81. Though Pinochet was stripped of his immunity, he never actually stood trial. Chile Drops 
Pinochet Trial, BBC NEWS (Jul. 1, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2080500.stm. Pinochet 
was originally arrested in London in 2002 on a warrant from Spain, charging him with human rights 
violations during his reign. Pinochet Arrested in London, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 1998), http://news.bbc 
.co.uk/2/hi/europe/195413.stm. The Law Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom, then twice 
ruled that despite his status as a former head of state, he was not immune from prosecution. Pinochet 
Faces Extradition Battle, BBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 1998), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ 
221718.stm. In October of 2000, the Law Lords ordered Pinochet’s extradition to Spain for trial. Way 
Cleared for Pinochet Extradition, BBC NEWS (Oct. 8, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ 
468589.stm. However, growing concerns over Pinochet’s health following his third stroke, Pinochet 
Offered Medical Tests, BBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/506588.stm, 
the Law Lords held in March 2000 that he was not fit for trial, and Pinochet returned to Chile, 
Pinochet Set Free, BBC NEWS (Mar. 2, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/663170.stm. 
Following his return to Chile, Pinochet was stripped of his immunity, Spain Hails Pinochet Decision, 
BBC NEWS (June 6, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/778353.stm, a move that was 
supported by Chilean President Ricardo Lagos, Chile President Backs Pinochet Verdict, BBC NEWS 
(Aug. 9, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/871134.stm, and formal charges were brought 
against Pinochet on December 1, 2000, Pinochet Charged with Kidnapping, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 
2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1050374.stm. However, following a trial that lasted 
roughly eighteen months, the case was dismissed on the grounds that Pinochet was mentally unfit to 
stand trial. Chile Drops Pinochet Trial, BBC NEWS (July 1, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
americas/ 2080500.stm. See also generally, ARIEL DORFMAN, EXORCISING TERROR: THE INCREDIBLE 
UNENDING TRIAL OF AUGUSTO PINOCHET (2002); NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECT: 
TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002).  
 82. See Latin American Amnesty Laws Annulled; The Struggle Against Impunity Continues, 
PEACE PALACE LIBRARY (Jan. 27, 2011), http://peacepalacelibrary-weekly.blogspot.com/2011/01/ 
latin-american-amnesty-laws-annulled.html (explaining that Chillean amnesty laws have not been 
formerly annulled) [hereinafter Latin American Amnesty Laws Annulled]. 
 83. See Almonacid-Arellano,  ¶ 171(2)-(3). 
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Inacio Lula DaSilva was slow to react.84 However, legal pressure may be 
forcing the hand of the current Brazilian government. In early 2010, the 
Brazilian Supreme Court declared that the Brazilian amnesty law shielded 
torturers from prosecution.85 On the heels of the Brazilian Supreme 
Court’s declaration of impropriety, and the 2010 IACHR ruling of 
incompatibility with the American Convention on Human Rights,86 current 
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has supported a probe into the human 
rights violations that took place during the dictatorship.87 Despite this act 
of good faith, many believe that any probe into crimes committed during 
the dictatorship will be ineffective without an official repeal or annulment 
of the law, either legislatively or judicially, since without such a repeal or 
annulment, the worst offenders will still not be held accountable for their 
actions.88 
ANALYSIS 
As the vote to repeal the Uruguayan Expiry Law was announced, 
hundreds of citizens stood and applauded as they watched the proceedings 
unfold from their bird’s eye view in the halls above the Capitol Building.89 
The repeal was a historic event for Uruguay, and, for a multitude of 
reasons, one that will be looked upon favorably for generations to come. 
The repeal of the law will provide—and has already started to 
provide—citizens with a sense of justice and relief. Uruguay’s dictatorship 
ended in 1986.90 A quarter of a century later, many of the Uruguayan 
citizens who suffered through the atrocities are still alive and in search of 
justice.91 When other Latin American countries have repealed or curtailed 
their amnesty laws for crimes against humanity committed during 
dictatorships, the responses from the people have been overwhelmingly 
positive.92 Speaking loudly to avoid being drowned out by the celebration 
 
 
 84. Stuart Grudgings, Brazil Urged to Prosecute Abuses from Dictatorship, REUTERS, Dec. 14, 
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/15/us-brazil-dictatorship-idUSTRE6BE09D 
20101215 (stating that as of 2010, Brazil had not sentenced anyone for crimes committed during the 
1964–1985 dictatorship).  
 85. Id.  
 86. Lund v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219 (Nov. 24, 2010). 
 87. Amnesty Law Limits Brazilian Soul Searching, BRUNEI TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.bt 
.com.bn/features/2011/09/08/amnesty-law-limits-brazilian-soul-searching.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Uruguay Overturns Amnesty, supra note 44. 
 90. Uruguay—History, supra note 12. 
 91. Lopez-Gamundi, supra note 10. 
 92. See, e.g., Argentina: Amnesty Laws Struck Down, supra note 73; Tribune News Services, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss4/9
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that followed the passage of the law, Luis Puig, a member of the Broad 
Front Party remarked:  
This is an historic night. Our people have been fighting impunity for 
twenty-five years. It is an homage to all those who resisted the 
dictatorship, their mothers and relatives, and all those who for many 
years kept on fighting when the state stood against the claims for 
truth and justice.93 
By the same token, not only do the victims deserve redress, the 
perpetrators of the crimes must be held accountable for their actions. 
Refusing to prosecute human rights violations, even with the noble intent 
of forgetting the past and moving toward the future, implicitly condones 
the actions of human rights violators during the dictatorship.94 President 
Mujica has publicly taken the stance that in order for Uruguay to move 
forward into the future, the human rights abuses must be left in the past, 
and the country must be allowed to heal through time rather than through 
the prosecution of twenty-five year-old crimes.95 However, this stance is 
far from universal96 and is insufficient to trump the need to provide redress 
to victims and punish those responsible for Uruguay’s past atrocities. 
Moreover, maintaining Uruguay’s Expiry Law would inevitably have 
led to continued selective enforcement and inequitable application of the 
law.97 As discussed above, Article 4 of Uruguay’s Expiry Law allows the 
executive to open human rights cases even when they fall within the 
exceptions of the Expiry Law.98 At first glance, there seems to be a tenable 
argument that the Expiry Law does not offend the application of justice, 
but this is not the case. By placing all control in the hands of the executive, 
the drafters of the Expiry Law left all discretionary enforcement in the 
hands of those susceptible to political winds. This would likely have led to 
 
 
supra note 74; Argentina’s Last Dictator, supra note 75; Newberry & Barrionuevo, supra note 75; 
Peru: Attacks on Justice, supra note 76. 
 93. Uruguay Overturns Amnesty, supra note 44. 
 94. William W. Burke-White, Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory 
to an Analysis of Amnesty Legislation, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 467, 467 (2001). Burke indicates that 
several dictators have allowed for a peaceful transition to democracy in exchange for their amnesty. Id. 
However, Burke-White indicates that amnesty rests on three fundamental problems:  
First, it is often enacted by self-serving dictators. Second, it may conflict with the subject 
state’s domestic law or constitution. Third, it often violates a state’s international obligations 
to prosecute certain crimes and to provide citizens with specific rights of redress.  
Id. As discussed above, all three of these problems apply to Uruguay’s unique situation.  
 95. Could Cost Ruling Coalition, supra note 43.  
 96. Uruguay Congress Upholds Military Rule Amnesty Law, supra note 35. 
 97. See Uruguay’s Expiry Law Silences Democracy, supra note 21. 
 98. See Expiry Law, supra note 17, arts. 3–4. 
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many crimes remaining unpunished in the name of political unity and 
patronage.99 
Further, the Expiry Law no longer served a purpose. More than sixty 
cases re-opened in 2005 under President Tabare Vazquez pursuant to 
Article 4 under the Expiry Law led to the conclusion that thirty-eight 
people died at the hands of the military and the attribution of culpability 
for such crimes.100 Following the May fiasco when the Uruguayan 
Congress failed to repeal the law, President Mujica allowed for the re-
opening of up to eighty cases of alleged human rights violations.101 These 
two mass re-openings of cases, combined with the thirty-year sentence of 
Bordaberry in 2007 after finding him “guilty of violating the constitution 
by shutting down Congress . . . and of rights violations in . . . other . . . 
cases involving disappearances and murder”102 suggests that the law had 
run its course. The exceptions are now beginning to swallow the rule, 
whether the law remained in place or not.103  
Since the exceptions were beginning to swallow the rule and many of 
the worst offenders had already been punished, some argue that repealing 
the law would have very little practical effect and is thus unnecessary.104 
However, a repeal of the law is far from unnecessary, and while it may be 
 
 
 99. See Uruguay’s Expiry Law Silences Democracy, supra note 21. 
 100. Juan Nivarez, Jose Mujica, Uruguay Re-Opening 80 Cases of Human Rights Violations, 
TOONARI POST (July 9, 2011), http://www.toonaripost.com/2011/07/world-news/jose-mujica-uruguay-
re-opening-80-cases-of-human-rights-violations/.  
 101. Uruguay Open to Rights Cases of Dictator Era, supra note 22. Mujica, a former political 
prisoner during the dictatorship, has been enigmatic throughout this process. He ran on a platform 
partially dedicated to the repeal of the Expiry Law, but has since changed position and asked that 
Congress not repeal the law. Id. However, Mujica has rejected a “national agreement” proposal from 
retired military officers that would have effectively avoided any more investigations or trials. Id.  
 102. Former Uruguayan Dictator Gets 30-Year Prison Sentence for Coup, LATIN AMERICAN 
HERALD TRIBUNE (Nov. 25, 2010), http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=23620&ArticleId= 
352106. Bordaberry’s arrest and investigation, though it was for human rights abuses among other 
crimes, was not initiated under Article 4 executive authorization, but was not covered under the Expiry 
Law since Bordaberry was a Civilian leader. Id.  
 103. Id. One author observed: 
According to some, the law is also riddled with loopholes—it permits prosecution of forced 
adoptions of political prisoners’ children and of crimes committed abroad (a category that 
includes the vast majority of kidnappings)—many of the worst era’s offenders, including two 
former de facto presidents, have already been convicted. 
The Economist Analyzes Uruguay’s Debate on the “Expiration Law”, MERCO PRESS (Nov. 25, 2010), 
http://en.mercopress.com/2010/11/25/the-economist-analyzes-uruguay-s-debate-on-rejecting-the-expiration 
-law [hereinafter The Economist Analyzes]. 
 104. Id.  
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the case that some of the worst offenders have been punished,105 this is not 
equivalent to every victim having their day in court, and leaving the law as 
it stood would do very little to restore the trust in the government. 
The repeal of the law also gives legitimacy to the IACHR, to whose 
binding authority Uruguay voluntarily submitted.106 The refusal to 
recognize the IACHR’s recent ruling invalidating the Expiry Law on the 
grounds that it was inconsistent with the American Convention on Human 
Rights would essentially have allowed Uruguay to opt out of their 
international obligations whenever Congress or the majority of citizens 
decided that those obligations were inconvenient or not in the best 
interests of the country.107 In an increasingly globalized world, 
international legal bodies are only as strong as the respect given by the 
states that voluntarily submit to them. Allowing Uruguay to opt out of 
their international obligations as a matter of convenience could lead to the 
increased disrespect for international legal bodies.  
Similarly, a refusal to repeal or at least alter the law would have 
detracted from the Uruguayan Supreme Court’s legitimacy. In a system 
that is supposed to resemble that of the United States in terms of checks 
and balances and separation of powers,108 it is a dangerous proposition to 
give continuing legal effect to a law twice invalidated as-applied by the 
Uruguayan Supreme Court.109 Similar to the international context, had 
Uruguay allowed the unconstitutional law to stand, it may have taken 
away from citizens’ confidence in the internal judicial system and 
thwarted the continuing entrenchment of a long-lasting democracy. 
Finally, and not of minimal significance, the invalidation of the Expiry 
Law allows Uruguay to fall in line with the positive trends in Latin 
 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 30, at pmbl.; American Convention 
on Human Rights: Members Chart, supra note 30.  
 107. The Economist Analyzes, supra note 102. The reference to the “Uruguayan people” is a 
reference to the 1989 Referendum and the 2009 Referendum, in which the citizens voted to keep the 
Expiry Law. See Expiry Law, Two Decades Later, the Discussion is Renewed, supra note 23. President 
Mujica even cited the results of the referendum as a valid reason for not repealing the law. See Major 
Setback, supra note 36 (writing that “Mujica . . . requested the bill should not be annulled, arguing it 
would be ignoring two referendums with serious institutional consequences and could trigger electoral 
backlash for the ruling coalition in the future.”). While Mujica’s argument that repealing the law 
would have meant disrespect of the will of the people may have been valid before the IACHR’s ruling 
invalidating the law, it now appears that there is no remaining legitimate justification for repealing the 
law, and consequently, that the platform for Mujica’s argument has disappeared. 
 108. See 1967 Constitution, supra note 1. 
 109. See The Economist Analyzes, supra note 102. 
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America, and encourages Brazil and Chile to follow suit.110 As a result, 
Uruguay must be commended for its courageous and inspirational step 
toward justice. 
Daniel Soltman∗ 
 
 
 110. See Amnesty Law Limits Brazilian Soul Searching, supra note 86 (referencing that Brazil still 
has not repealed its amnesty law as of 2011); Latin American Amnesty Laws Annulled, supra note 81.  
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